THE NEGRO GHETTOS AND FEDERAL
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The summer racial disturbances which have recently become epidemic have
focussed attention upon the United States' most important and perplexing domestic
problem-rampant racial ghettoization of its major cities. The Negro ghettos are to
a considerable degree a product of American housing policies of the post-World War
II era. Ironically, they now stand as one of the greatest obstacles to achievement of
the nation's goal of decent housing for all its citizens.
These racial concentrations-which are also concentrations of the most deprived
of all Americans in virtually every sense of the term-are of impressive size. Today
the Negro populations of at least five major cities are estimated to exceed half a
million. Negroes constitute close to two-thirds of all residents of Washington, D.C.;
more than one-third of the citizens of Baltimore and New Orleans; over one-fourth of
those residing in Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis. In all cases they
are compressed into limited areas, while large sections of the same cities remain
almost exclusively white. In some places like New York and Los Angeles, where
the Negro proportions are somewhat smaller, other severely disadvantaged groups
like Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans are similarly ghettoized in large numbers.
The recent rate of growth of the urban ghettos can best be described as explosive.
During the i95os alone the Negro population of New York increased by forty-six
per cent; of Detroit by sixty per cent; of Los Angeles by ninety-six per cent; of
Milwaukee by a staggering 187 per cent.2 Such rapid increase in a problem-ridden
population, together with its compression into areas of the central cities which are
most deficient in housing and other facilities and services, helps explain why every
one of these cities has recently suffered destructive racial violence.
Today, violence is only the most extreme and obvious symptom of the problems
which the slum ghettos are causing the major cities and this nation. Washington,
D.C., where ghettoization has proceeded farthest of any, affords some illustrative
statistics.? In the twelve years between 1954 and 1966, Washington's total population
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held virtually constant at about 8ooooo while its Negro population increased from
somewhat over one-third of that total to about two-thirds. During the same period,
Washington's public school enrollment increased by almost fifty per cent. Its public
assistance caseload rose from 7,500 to ii,4oo despite stringent restrictions upon welfare
eligibility. The number of authorized policemen was increased from 23o0 to 3I00;
but the crime rate rose even faster, elevating Washington to the unenviable position
of one of the most crime-ridden of American cities.
Today, Washington has one of the highest venereal disease rates of any major
city, and rates of infant mortality and school retardation exceeding many of the
most backward states of the Union. In response to the problems the municipal
budget has been forced steadily upward, virtually doubling in the last seven years
alone. Yet the city still faces pressing shortages of facilities and services of virtually
every type to serve the needs of a population which grows increasingly unable to meet
the costs.
One of these shortages is a critical lack of decent housing within the economic
means of Washington's low-income families. A recent study by the National Capital
Planning Commission 4 estimated that half of the city's household population is
unable to afford sound, uncrowded rental housing at the prices which prevail in the
private market. Almost no new housing is being constructed for this segment of the
population; and private rehabilitation and luxury apartment-house construction in
the central district continue to chip away at the existing supply priced within their
capacity to pay. Meanwhile, the overall condition of the city's housing stock is
believed by expert sources to be deteriorating under the pressure of overcrowding and
"slumlord" exploitation. Washington's ghettos thus grow not only blacker but more
ill-housed with every passing year.
Quite clearly, the needs and problems of Washington's Negro slums have already
surpassed the city's ability to cope with them. Even massive infusions of federal
grant funds-now exceeding ioo million dollars a year-have failed to close the
growing gap between needs and available resources, not to mention reversing the
tide of deterioration.
Is Washington, which first passed the fifty per cent mark in Negro proportion
at the 1960 Census, merely the prototype for a number of other major cities-including Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and St. Louiswhich will probably have Negro majorities by i98o at the latest? Can the social and
physical blight of such cities be overcome as long as the ghettos exist? Will the
American democratic system itself survive continued political and social upheaval
to which the riots of the last several summers may well be only prelude?
One thing at least is becoming clear: solutions will not be simple. The ghettos
concentrate human problems and frustrations to a degree which immensely increases
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the obstacles to their solution. All the public investment to date in experimental
anti-poverty programs, job training, compensatory education, and other approaches
has not produced solutions which could be guaranteed to make the racial enclaves
within the cities economically and socially viable. Particularly unsettling is the
evidence that many of the participants in recent outbreaks of ghetto violence have
not been among the most abjectly deprived members of the minority population.
A goodly number have been persons who have already climbed a certain way up the
long ladder to equality, but who realize how very far and filled with obstacles is the
distance remaining.5
The pressure of needs upon the resources within the ghettos will continue to grow,
for the ghettos themselves will almost certainly keep growing. The reason lies in
basic demographic facts. Even if migration of minorities from rural areas to the
cities were to cease completely, their rate of natural increase is now sufficient to
continue the increase of those groups within the urban centers at a rapid pace. The
Negro slum populations are young on the whole, with high concentrations in the
teen and early adult years.
On the other hand, the recent exodus of whites from cities to suburbs has been
heavily concentrated among families of prime childbearing age. Thus, the whites
left in the cities tend increasingly to be past the age where they can increase their
numbers. Again to cite an example from the nation's capital city, two-thirds of the
white adult population of Washington is now past the age of forty.' It does not
require clairvoyance to foresee that Washington's Negro population will continue
to increase rapidly both in numbers and in proportion to the whole.
Thus, there will be continued consolidation and expansion of the heavily-Negro
concentrations until they fill the central cities and extend into the suburbs. At the
same time, white resistance to the racial conversion of neighborhoods formerly closed
to Negroes can be expected to remain high, especially in the solid, highly-organized
ethnic areas which still abound in most northern industrial centers. There will be
at least two concomitants: first, the areas of Negro residence will continue to expand
less slowly than the need. Second, there will be a continuing high level of racial
tension and sporadic open conflict, due both to the bottling-up of Negroes with their
needs and frustrations within the ghettos, and to white reactions to the expressions
of frustration and the inexorable expansion of ghetto boundaries. The economic
viability of central business districts will continue to be threatened as they are surrounded by widening areas of social and economic deprivation and conflict.
These will be the virtually inevitable consequences unless measures of sufficient
scope are taken to eliminate the racial ghettos as a feature of the American urban
5
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landscape, and to replace them with unsegregated patterns of residence. While
this will be no easy task, the alternative of a nation both racially divided and continually at war within itself is not a prospect most Americans will accept with
equanimity. It is the contention of this article that solutions are possible, albeit
difficult. We seek to demonstrate the following points: (i) The racial ghettos are
chiefly creatures of public policy, and in large part of housing policy, which fostered
and directed their growth into present patterns. (2) To a major degree, the ghettos
are also products of the post-World War II era. For example, in 1940 Washington's
Negro population was less than half its present size, and was segregated to a much
less rigid degree.7 (3) What public policy has created within a single generation,
it is equally capable of undoing in a similar span of time. To achieve this, however,
will require a massive reorientation of available resources.
First, let us review the contributions of public policy to the emergence of the
ghettos. Its role can best be understood when viewed against the background of the
major population trends which shaped the development of the nation as a whole
during the period of the ghettos' most rapid growth.
One of these forces was a high overall rate of population increase: twenty-eight
million people were added to the United States population in the 195os alone.
A second was urbanization: about eighty-five per cent of this staggering growth
was concentrated in only 212 metropolitan areas, while most rural sections had
substantial net out-migrations.8
National policy unquestionably helped accelerate the cityward migration by
encouraging the development of mechanized agricultural techniques and the consolidation of small family farms into huge agricultural "factories" where mass
production methods were most feasible. At the same time, the federal government
did little or nothing to encourage the development of smaller towns within largely
rural areas. Thus, it became necessary for many of those displaced to move long
distances to the major cities in search of employment.
The policy factors mentioned so far were largely neutral in terms of race. However, a disproportionate number of the long-distance migrants, especially in a southto-north direction, were Negro. One reason was that the low-skilled farm workers
displaced by mechanization were heavily Negro. A second was less accidental: the
traditional discriminatory practices of the south, and the reluctance of the federal
government to interfere in these practices, meant that few job opportunities were
available for displaced Negro farm workers in southern commerce and industry.
Thus, in both positive and negative fashion, public policies and practices paved the
route for the Negro migration to the great metropolitan complexes of the north.
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It was after the Negro migrants arrived at northern destinations, however, that
public policy played its most decisive role in shaping the ghettos. The prime
guiding forces were applied in the housing area. Both at the federal and the local
levels, virtually every aspect of housing policy interlocked to encourage the concentration of Negro newcomers within the central city slums, and to prevent their
escape once they had begun to climb the economic ladder.
Until recent years, federal policy in housing was mainly supportive of racial
segregation. At the very least, it did little to interfere with discriminatory practices
by local authorities and private entrepreneurs; at the worst (and particularly before
i95o), it actively encouraged such practices Not until President Kennedy's landmark Executive Order of November 196210 was the federal government placed
clearly on record to the effect that racial discrimination in housing was contrary
to the national interest.
That presidential directive, even then, may have been more an expression of
individual belief than of national policy. Five years later it still had not been
backed up by legislation, and a bill strengthening the Civil Rights Act of x964 n had
failed of enactment in Congress largely because it added housing to the Act's jurisdiction.
Until the late i94os the Federal Housing Administration's UnderwritingManual
had advised appraisers to lower their ratings of properties in neighborhoods occupied
by "inharmonious racial or nationality groups . . . often to the point of rejection."
To assure continuing racial stability in newly developed neighborhoods, it recommended a model restrictive covenant for inclusion in property deeds. A Supreme
Court decision of 1948 rendered racial covenants legally unenforceable; but it was
not until early in i95o, well into the post-war suburban boom, that FHA ceased
insuring new developments covered by them."2 Prior to i95o, also, FHA's encouragement of segregated development had not been limited to recommending it. Private
developers who proposed to build for interracial occupancy were treated to a variety
of delaying and obstructing tactics. Some gave up and accepted the requirement
of segregation; but in at least two instances, builders who held firmly to nondiscriminatory policies were driven out of business by persistent FHA opposition
3
which prevented them from securing mortgage financing.'
In varying ways and to varying degrees, FHA's policies and practices were
mirrored by other federal agencies influential in the provision of housing. These
included the Public Housing Administration, which encouraged the development of
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segregated projects according to a "racial equity" formula by which units were
separately constructed for whites and nonwhites in proportions based on a statistical
estimate of relative need. If the needs of the two groups subsequently changed, the
allocation of units usually did not. They also included the Veterans Administration,
which guaranteed home mortgages for returning veterans, but followed FHA's lead
in regard to the kinds of new developments on which those benefits were made
available. 4
In the years following i95o, there was a gradual liberalization of the policies
of the federal housing and renewal agencies regarding race; but the changes were
specific and limited, and in no sense did the federal government possess a consistent policy against housing discrimination until the 1962 Executive Order.
Under the terms of the Order, FHA and other federal agencies providing housing
assistance are required to withhold their aid from builders who discriminate. The
coverage of the Order does not extend to housing already on the books before its
effective date, or to housing without federal assistance. It is presently estimated that
the Order covers only fifteen per cent of new housing, and between two and three
per cent of the total housing stock."5 Further, the enforcement machinery is basically
weak, relying almost exclusively on the compliance machinery of the assisting
agencies.
Before the federal prohibition, however, a number of the most populous northern
states had adopted laws barring housing discrimination within their jurisdictionsand often having coverage which extended beyond housing receiving governmental
aid and into the exclusively private sector. They included such important states as
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Michigan.
The number of states possessing such laws has continued to increase, totalling
twenty-two as of 196730 In addition, a number of jurisdictions have progressively
broadened the coverage of their initial legislation. While the enforcement mechanisms vary in effectiveness, most are quite weak and cumbersome. But there is little
question that in most parts of the United States today, a minority family possessing
the will, the perseverance, and adequate financial means can buy or rent housing
approximating their preference as to price, size, and style in a fairly wide range of
locations outside traditional "ghetto" areas.
14
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Does this mean that the problem is well on its way to solution? The answer
must be in the negative. At this point in history even the broadest "Fair Housing"
legislation, however adequately enforced, would be insufficient to reverse or even
to stabilize the growth of the ghettos. Would nondiscrimination in the administration of the programs from their inception have prevented the ghettos from expanding
to their present magnitude? However paradoxical it may seem, the answer to this
question is also "No"--and for the same reason. The major source of difficulty
has never been in discriminatory administration of the federal housing programs.
The basic legislative provisions governing the provision of most such benefits assure
that the bulk of minority members are unable to take advantage of them, however
fairly they are administered.
The entire thrust of federal involvement in the housing field has worked against
the availability of federal benefits to deprived minorities such as Negroes. One key
lies in the following statement of policy quoted from a recent publication of the
U.S. Bureau of the Budget: "The Federal Government encourages better housing for
the Nation primarily by assuring the availability of private credit on reasonable
terms."11 This emphasis, which derives from the origin of federal housing programs
as an economic stimulator in the post-i929 depression, means that the benefits of
federal involvement are made available chiefly to those who can pay their own way
in the private market.
Most Negroes have automatically been excluded by this fact alone.' 8 Estimation
of the proportion of Negro families able to pay private-market prices for new
housing is a complicated matter, varying with both income levels and building costs
in different localities. Nonetheless, a rough indication of the proportion of Negro
families who might be considered candidates for new privately-financed housing is
provided by a recent federal report which shows that only twenty-eight per cent
of nonwhite families in the United States had incomes of $7ooo or more in 1966.
During the height of the post-World War II building boom, in the early i95os, the
proportion was much lower-ranging from five to nine per cent adjusted for subsequent price changes.' 9
This fact would be of less moment had supplementary federal aids been made
available on a scale sufficient to meet the housing needs of minority families who
17U.S. Bu.Aau os THE BUDGET, ExactTE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET IN BRIEF, FISCAL
YEAR 1967, at 42 (I966).
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could not participate in the private market. But such aids have been decidedly
limited. Throughout most of the postwar housing boom-during which an average
of more than one million new private dwellings were constructed annually-the sole
federal resource available to aid in improving the housing of low-income families was
the subsidized low-rent public housing program. This program, established under
the Housing Act of 1937,2° employs direct federal subsidies to local housing

authorities to achieve rents keyed to capacity to pay.
Three decades after its establishment, at the end of September 1967, federallysubsidized public housing had some 66oooo units under management.2' This is
only one per cent of the total housing stock, and about half of a single year's new
private construction at current rates. Throughout its lifespan, the public housing
program has added an average of only 20,000 units annually-far less than the annual
increase in the number of low-income minority households. By no means all public
housing units, moreover, have been available to nonwhites. Furthermore, even the
minor contribution of public housing to the improved housing of racial minorities
has been made chiefly within the boundaries of the central cities and rarely in the
suburbs-further enhancing the development of the ghettos.
In the past several years, increased public concern for the housing of low- and
moderate-income families has added some weapons to the federal armament-for the
first time providing a modicum of encouragement to private effort to enter this
previously unrewarding field. But the first of these new measures was not enacted
until the early i96os. In the interim the postwar housing boom, spurred by federal
incentives to private enterprise, had produced many millions of new private dwellings
in suburban areas-on terms which restricted them almost solely to whites. During
this period, the housing needs of expanding Negro and other minority population
were met chiefly by succession to the older, often decaying dwellings left behind
in the central cities by whites moving to the new homes being built in the suburbs.
The Housing Act of i96 initiated a new form of federal encouragement to
private construction of housing for families unable to pay normal private-market
rates. This is the FHA 221 (d) (3) "below-market-interest-rate" program.2 2 It lowers
housing costs through direct purchase of mortgages by the Federal National Mortgage Association at interest rates considerably below those demanded by private
lenders. Currently, the maximum rate is three per cent. This interest-rate subsidy
allows prices low enough to aid families above public-housing income maxima but
under private housing levels. Many minority families are in this previously-unaided category.
The program has been slow to get underway, however. Six years after its estab20 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1964, Supp. II, 1965-66).
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lishment, at the end of September 1967, only 67,ioo units had been insured. The
present level of appropriation permits adding only about 40,000 units annually.2
The Housing Act of 1965 authorized still another form of assistance-direct rent
supplements to owners of private housing to enable them to accommodate low-income
families 4 This program for the first time permits low-income families to be integrated with those of somewhat higher incomes within the same housing development. The program was hody contested in Congress, however; and despite its enactment no appropriations were forthcoming to implement it until fiscal year 1967when the amount allocated was only $32 million 5 Only $io million has been
appropriated for the current fiscal year.
In fiscal year 1967, and in a number of prior years, federal programs to aid private
housing in combination generated more receipts than expenditures-placing them
among very few federal programs which show a "profit." (Premiums charged for
insurance and sales of acquired properties and mortgages account for most of this.)
Few better commentaries could be made on the degree to which these programs
have helped meet the housing needs of those citizens unable to bear the full market
price.2 0 The excess of receipts over expenditures in these federal aids to private
housing was so great ($137 million) as to erase more than half of the $200 million
spent by the federal government on subsidies for public housing in the same year.
It has already been suggested that there was a geographic concomitant to the
racial and economic selectivity of federal housing programs. To state this geographic
factor more fully and explicitly, the new private housing stimulated by federal
policies was built chiefly on the open land available on the suburban fringes of the
expanding metropolitan areas. The fact that this housing was not available to the
great majority of Negroes meant, perforce, that the suburbs became almost exclusively white.
Simultaneously, the expanding housing needs of the Negro populations within
the central cities were met (however inadequately) within the central cities,
in dwellings left behind by departing whites. Private speculators and "blockbusting" real estate brokers aided the process of racial conversion to their
personal profit. The public housing program, limited as it was in magnitude, further enhanced the trend of segregation by the fact that, where it made dwellings
available to Negroes, these were generally located in central areas already heavily
nonwhite in composition.
The federally-supported urban renewal program, initiated under the Housing
Act of i949, was a foresighted effort to retain and restore the economic viability of
central urban areas by encouraging more affluent segments of the population to
"This figure was supplied by the U.S. Federal Housing Administration, Dep't of Housing and
Urban Development.
12 U.S.C. § 1701S (Supp. II, 1965-66).
This figure was supplied by the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development.
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return. It did this by providing federal subsidies for the acquisition, clearance, and
resale to private developers of blighted urban areas. From its inception, the urban
renewal program was administered with more sensitivity to the problem of racial
discrimination than most other federal housing activities. As a consequence, a
number of urban renewal projects provided the first racially-unsegregated private
housing in their localities.
Nonetheless, the relatively high price levels of most urban renewal dwellings
effectively excluded all but a tiny majority of nonwhites from residence. And since
they were often located in areas formerly occupied by nonwhite slums, many such
projects merely resulted in opening a small white (or nearly white) hole in the
central Negro ghetto, while simultaneously causing the external boundaries of that
ghetto to expand still further outward.28
To sum up, federal housing policy encouraged the growth of the ghettos in two
main ways. First, during the major part of the postwar housing boom, federal
benefits were largely restricted to whites for both economic and racial reasons; as
we have indicated, the economic selectivity was by far the more important. Second,
the geographic location of new federally-stimulated construction was such as to
enhance segregation by drawing whites out of the central cities toward the suburbs,
and permitting the areas they left behind to be occupied by Negroes. Only in the
early i96os, after a decade and a half during which the all-white suburbs and their
counterpart central-city Negro ghettos had grown to a point where they presented
the nation with a domestic problem of frightening scope and complexity, were federal
policies modified. These modifications were in two directions: first of all, to restrict
racial discrimination in application of the federal benefits; and second, to assist
private developers to serve a wider socioeconomic range. Even then, the measures
were so limited in scope that they could not conceivably halt, let alone reverse, the
now well-established tide of ghettoization.
Is it too late to undo what has been done? To believe that the point of no return
has been passed is to accept the alternatives which have been outlined on preceding
pages. It may also be to accept the loss of many of America's most highly cherished
democratic protections. Already efforts to repress ghetto violence are producing
legislation and police procedures which, carried to their logical extreme, could
transform a free nation into a police state. Ultimately, the majority may suffer as
much as the minority from the end effects of continued ghettoization and racial
conflict.
Would the dissolution of ghetto patterns require forced redistribution of population? In answer, it is only necessary to point out that about half of all American
households changed their place of residence during the latter half of the i95os
"8 This problem is discussed in E. Grier and G. Grier, Federal Powers in Housing Affecting Race
Relations, Sept. z962 (an unpublished paper prepared for the Potomac Institute and the Washington
Center for Metropolitan Studies).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

alone. Residential mobility is so much a part of the "American way of life" that
a virtually complete redistribution of the population can easily be achieved within
the span of a single generation, and without forcing anyone to move.
Such a massive redistribution has, in fact, largely been accomplished during the
two decades since the conclusion of World War II. It has resulted in the present
ghettoized pattern. The ultimate form of any future redistribution will depend
largely upon the federal incentives which are applied to shape it. Continuation
of present incentive patterns can only lead to the further growth of segregation.
What alterations in the pattern of federal benefits would accomplish the elimination of segregated residential patterns most effectively and economically? This
question requires further study, and determination of the best means should be
an objective of highest federal priority. But it is probable that measures recently
placed on the books point the way. More flexible federal benefits; incentive programs which encourage private enterprise to produce housing for lower-income
groups; measures which encourage racial and socioeconomic diversity both within
particular housing developments and throughout entire metropolitan areas; measures
which free housing subsidies from restriction to dwellings in control of public
housing authorities or (as in the section 221 (d) (3) program) of non-profit sponsors;
strengthened prohibitions against discrimination-these appear to constitute the most
promising routes for federal intervention. Above all, it will be necessary for far
greater funds to be allocated to assist families presently unable to compete in the
private market.
These measures in the housing field must, of course, be accompanied by programs
to improve the economic capability of minority groups and to overcome the manifold
social deficits resulting from generations of selective disadvantage. The end goal of
all such programs must, however, be to enable Negroes to take their place in the
mainstream of American life-not to solidify the structure of the ghettos. The cost
of adequate efforts will be high, but must be measured against the alternatives. There
is little question that they are affordable, especially in light of the tremendous
expenditures which accompanied the redistribution just accomplished.
Finally, and certainly not least, it will be necessary for the more fortunate white
majority to learn to accept racial integration as desirable and, indeed, essential in every
area of life. This will require fundamental reorientation of the values and biases
which contributed to the direction of present federal policies. Can a democratic
nation achieve such a redirection? This is the final unanswered question. Upon
the nation's ability to face it and to answer it may rest its own survival.

